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 
Abstract— In today’s mobile application marketplace, the 
ability of consumers to make informed choices regarding their 
privacy is extremely limited. Consumers largely rely on privacy 
policies and app permission mechanisms, but these do an 
inadequate job of conveying how information will be collected, 
used, stored, and shared. Mobile application developers go 
largely unrewarded for making apps more privacy conscious as it 
is difficult to communicate these features to consumers while they 
are searching for a new app. This paper provides an overview of 
a framework designed to help consumers make informed choices, 
and an incentive mechanism to encourage app developers to 
implement it. This framework includes machine readable privacy 
policies encouraged by mobile app stores and enhanced by user 
software agents. Such a framework would provide the foundation 
required for more advanced forms of privacy management to 
develop. 
 
Index Terms—Data privacy, Electronic commerce, Mobile 
computing 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
RIVACY is increasingly a concern in today’s digitally 
connected world. Information about people, much of it 
private, is being collected and stored in an ever increasing 
number of ways and places. An individual’s relationships used 
to be known by a small group; now that same information is 
stored on their phone, by their cellular service provider, 
multiple social networks, email providers, gaming platforms, 
and an array of mobile applications residing on their 
smartphone or tablet.  
This last category, the apps on their smartphone or tablet, 
are the focus of this paper. Mobile devices are particularly 
concerning from a privacy point of view as they are carried 
with people on a daily basis and can be used to collect and 
transmit information at fine geographic and temporal 
resolutions. This enhanced data environment enables many 
new and useful functions but comes with a concomitant rise in 
the risk of privacy failures.  
Mobile applications are part of and supported by an 
ecosystem of software, hardware and firms. What this 
ecosystem needs is a functional mechanism for ensuring that 
an individual’s privacy orientation is respected. The system 
needs to work for users across the spectrum of technological 
sophistication in a way that is unobtrusive yet provides 
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assurance that data about an individual is being used in a 
transparent way. 
This paper will argue for a data transparency framework 
that includes machine readable privacy policies encouraged by 
mobile app stores and enhanced by user software agents. Each 
of these components will be discussed in turn. 
Part one describes the mobile application privacy status quo 
and recent work on implementing machine readable privacy 
policies. Part two focuses on how mobile app stores could 
implement such programs (and indeed are in a unique position 
to do so). Part three explores how user agents can augment the 
services provided by app stores and help users make and 
maintain informed decisions. 
II. PRIVACY IN MOBILE APPLICATIONS 
Before discussing mobile applications, it is worth defining 
what is meant by privacy. A general conception of privacy is 
hard to come by, with Daniel Solove on page one of his book, 
Understanding Privacy, going so far as to say that nobody can 
articulate what it means [1]. While this paper is not intended 
to argue the merits of privacy, I will limit my discussion of 
privacy to mean the rights of individuals to control the 
collection, use and dissemination of their personal 
information. 
An interesting exercise is to think of personal information 
as a marketplace. This idea is certainly not novel, with 
Meglena Kuneva, the European Consumer Commissioner, 
calling data the new oil of the internet [2]. Much academic 
research exists on the personal data economy with issues such 
as who owns data [3], the economic downside of privacy [4], 
and issues of marketplace self-regulation [5].  
An important component of any public marketplace is 
transparency. The Securities and Exchange Commission exists 
for this purpose. If insider trading were legal then an efficient 
public market could not exist as potential investors would 
realize their knowledge disadvantage relative to insiders. 
Rather, insider trading is illegal with often severe prison 
sentences for those found engaging in it. The mobile data 
economy suffers from a similar lack of transparency: data 
collection, use, and dissemination practices are largely 
‘insider’ information and those that provide the data, the users, 
are often wary of revealing it (of participating in the market), 
like the potential investors from before. This hesitancy to 
reveal personal information could lead to lost economic gains. 
The withdrawal from the mobile information marketplace is 
not theoretical. According to the Pew Research Center, more 
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than half of all smartphone owners have avoided an app due to 
privacy concerns and 30% have uninstalled an app after they 
learned it was collecting personal information they did not 
wish to share [6].  
Given this information asymmetry in the information 
market, surprisingly few mechanisms have been developed to 
help individuals understand or control how their data will be 
used. These include privacy policies, app permission 
mechanisms, privacy certification services, app analysis tools 
and the occasional investigative report. Of these, I will focus 
on only the first two as they are widely used by companies 
(privacy policies) and the public (app permissions). However, 
for an excellent example of an app analysis tool, see the 
AppBrain Ad Detector [7] and for investigative journalism, 
see the Wall Street Journal’s “What they Know Mobile” series 
[8].  
A. Privacy Policies 
A privacy policy is typically a special page associated with 
an app, website, or firm that describes how data are collected, 
used, or shared. Often it includes information about how to 
opt-out of such practices. Such polices proliferated rapidly at 
the turn of the century, going from 2% of all websites in 1998 
to almost all popular websites by 2001 [9]. Ideally, these 
policies would convey to readers what data are collected, how 
the data are used and who the data are shared with. However, 
in practice, privacy policies exist more to protect firms from 
litigation than they do to inform users, and they can be error-
prone and difficult to read [10, 11]. This stems from how the 
FTC has prosecuted firms for violating their own privacy 
policy as a deceptive or unfair business practice. The resulting 
incentive is to make a bland and generic privacy policy with 
vague mentions of sharing information with ‘trusted business 
partners’ or collecting ‘other usage data’ that is written in 
legal language that is particularly difficult for the laymen to 
understand. 
Recognizing these shortcomings, the W3C attempted to 
implement a technology called the “Platform for Privacy 
Preferences” or P3P. This standard specified a structured 
document that would describe how an organization treated 
data. The structure allows a computer to read and understand 
the document (it is ‘machine readable’) and then parse it into 
natural language. Such software is called a P3P user agent, 
and it acts as an intermediary between data collectors and 
users. It can be configured to aid the user in avoiding websites 
that have data practices with which they are uncomfortable. 
However, the standard lacks any enforcement mechanism 
since no real connection exists between the P3P policy and the 
firm’s actual usage of personal information. 
P3P has many other shortcomings as documented by 
Hogben [12] that include the lack of formal semantics and 
poor adoption amongst browsers. Mozilla’s Firefox browser 
removed all P3P related code in the mid 2000’s, and this 
author could find no browser extension compatible with the 
latest Firefox release. While P3P is not at present a viable 
solution, it may provide a building block for better privacy 
languages. Work in this direction has already been completed 
[13]. 
In the mobile apps ecosystem, privacy policies exist for the 
majority of apps. Links to these are provided in the Google 
and Apple app stores. However, these privacy policies suffer 
from all the drawbacks mentioned previously; they are not 
machine readable, they are written in legal language and they 
are  overly vague. For example, the Angry Birds mobile app 
(owned by Rovio) has the following statement in its privacy 
policy: 
“Rovio or third parties may collect and use data, for 
[advertising] purposes, including but not limited to, data such 
as IP address, …, unique identifiers in browser cookies,…, 
Internet and on-line usage information and in-game 
information” 
and, 
“Rovio retains the collected data for the period necessary to 
fulfill the purposes outlined in this Privacy Policy unless a 
longer retention period is required or permitted by law. 
Thereafter Rovio deletes all aforementioned data in its 
possession within a reasonable timeframe.” [14] 
These statements are extraordinarily vague, but typical of 
privacy policies, noting that other data may be collected and 
that it can be retained as long as Rovio wants or is legally 
allowed. It is also unclear which portions of the privacy policy 
apply to Angry Birds as opposed to any of Rovio’s websites. 
Nowhere are the referenced 3rd parties actually named, so 
even if a user wanted to look at these other companies’ 
privacy policies they would have no ready way of doing so. 
Some independent analyses have been completed. Jason Hong 
of Carnegie-Mellon identified eight different ad networks 
included in the free version of Angry Birds [15]. 
After reading a few privacy policies, one can easily see how 
time consuming it would be to read through, analyze, and 
incorporate the information from them into a decision 
concerning which of 30 exercise apps to choose, or 25 
personal finance apps. 
B. App Permissions 
Both Android and iOS include permission mechanisms to 
limit access to personal information from mobile apps. 
Android uses a system of install-time warnings where users 
are presented with a list of required permissions and must 
accept them or forgo installing the app. Apple’s iOS uses a 
combination of runtime confirmation dialogs and review 
screens. The runtime confirmation dialogues appear the first 
time an app requests a particular permission, like access to 
location information, and users can deny the request and 
continue using the app. A review screen is displayed by iOS 
before certain actions, like sending a text message, allowing 
the user to see which application is trying to send it and giving 
them the opportunity to edit or dismiss the text. 
Both systems suffer from a lack of specificity in their 
permission models. No indication of why an app needs a 
particular permission is provided and Android’s install-time 
warnings are often ignored or misunderstood by users [16]. 
This lack of specificity manifests itself in two ways. First, 
some apps ask for permission they legitimately need but do 
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not seem to require at first glance. E.g., a calendar app may 
request access to contact information in order to better arrange 
meetings. Second, some apps request two separate permissions 
with obvious need, but use them together for non-obvious 
purposes. E.g., a traffic navigation app could request both 
internet access and location information (for obvious reasons) 
but then use those permissions to send location information to 
advertisers (a non-obvious purpose). 
C. What is Needed 
In order to provide real transparency, users need to have 
access to the types of information collected by an app and the 
context in which it is collected, used, stored and shared. A 
data’s context is the full picture surrounding it. It’s  not 
enough to know that an app has access to location 
information; in fact, that tells one very little. An app might 
have access to location data, but only use it to provide a 
specific service and never record or transmit it. The privacy 
risk in this situation is negligible. Rather than simply knowing 
what data an app might have access to (which is all a 
permission conveys), users need to know the context 
surrounding their data. Users should be able to easily find out 
what their data are used for, how often it is collected, where it 
is stored, how long it will be stored, how the data are 
connected with them (e.g. by their name, a device identifier, a 
hashed version of either), what sort of security protections are 
in place (when stored) and who it can potentially be shared 
with and for what purpose. These additional details, the 
context, provide the foundation upon which informed choices 
can be made. 
This sort of information should be readily available in 
privacy policies, but it is not. Even if it were included, users 
would face an insurmountable hurdle gathering the 
information for the subset of apps they are considering and 
incorporating it into their decision. Nor can that information 
be used to decide on the subset of apps to consider in the first 
place, which would require gathering information for all apps 
of possible interest. In the end, apps that do a better than 
average job of respecting a user’s privacy aren’t rewarded. 
The way to change this would be to place all that relevant 
data use information in a machine readable privacy policy 
(MRPP). This could be based on the previously mentioned 
P3P framework but would need to be made more precise. Such 
a document would contain a description of the collected data 
and their contexts; and, importantly, links to the MRPP (or 
domain name if none exists) of any 3rd parties that they share 
data with and those they receive data from. By requiring apps 
to list both data coming in and data leaving, a layer of 
accountability is provided. Two groups must omit the 
relationship in order to hide the transfer of data. It also 
provides an audit mechanism. Researchers or the app store 
itself can easily find one-way references and work to clarify 
the situation.  
With enough participation, the full implications of sharing 
personal information with a particular app can finally be 
realized. Each app would generate a web of data sharing going 
out potentially many degrees and the size and composition of 
this web could be used to help inform user choices. While 
analyzing a web of data is more tractable than a host of non-
standardized documents full of legalese, it is still beyond the 
technical ability of most and the attention span of nearly all. 
The final section of this paper will discuss mechanisms for 
easing the burden on the end users, illustrated by potential use 
cases. But first the issue of getting ‘enough participation’ will 
be addressed by looking at the incentives and capabilities of 
app stores. 
III. THE PRIVACY AWARE APP STORE 
App stores are uniquely situated to increase the 
transparency of mobile applications to end users. Unlike 
websites, there are relatively few app stores and this affords a 
degree of centralization that can be used to encourage 
increased transparency. However, is it in the interests of app 
stores and app developers to promote increased transparency? 
An analysis of the incentives faced by each may yield policies 
that can lay the groundwork for a transparency ‘race to top.’ 
Currently, very few incentives exist to reward app 
developers for harvesting less personal information or being 
more transparent about the ways they use and share data. The 
incentives are sticks rather than carrots – an app can suffer 
negative publicity or reviews if users find out their data isn’t 
handled properly. Both Google Play and the Apple App Store 
have rudimentary search features. This is particularly 
surprising in the case of Google as they have more combined 
experience in search than any organization in human history. 
Currently, it is not possible to do even simple searches like 
“games that don’t require internet access” in either app store. 
Privacy conscious users could greatly benefit from being able 
to see search results tailored to their preferences.  
However, even if that capability were added, it would still 
be insufficient for the aforementioned reasons – the ability to 
access certain data does not determine how it is actually used 
or shared. For that type of transparency a MRPP is needed. An 
app store could require this of all apps, but that might 
engender significant push back from app developers due to the 
burden of creating and maintaining another document using a 
new syntax. Some developers will certainly be wary about 
revealing their data collection and use practices. This could 
reduce the number of high quality apps in the store, which is 
one of the main metrics stores use to compete. Aside from 
simply requiring that all apps create a MRPP, there are many 
incentives that app stores could put in place that could 
encourage large numbers of app developers to participate. 
These incentives fall into two categories, improving app 
discovery and app adoption. 
The problem of app discovery stems from the fact that there 
are now more than one million apps on Google Play [17], and 
over 900,000 on Apple’s App Store [18]. As an app developer, 
it is difficult to get your app noticed amongst the millions of 
competing apps. Specialized services have sprung up to help 
with this specific problem [19]. App developers will often pay 
advertising networks to include links to their app in banner ads 
shown on mobile devices. Fisku is one such advertiser and 
they report that the average cost of acquiring a loyal user was 
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$1.90 in August of 2013 [20]. Anything that will make an app 
easier to find by app store users will serve as a strong 
incentive. App stores use some internal ranking algorithm to 
present search results to users, and this could be modified to 
boost the rank of apps that include a validated MRPP. 
Alternatively, users could be given the ability to search 
amongst only those apps that have a MRPP, or by specific 
characteristics that only a MRPP would reveal. App 
developers might be particularly interested in these types of 
searches as they might be utilized more by individuals willing 
to pay for apps that protect their privacy.  
A second avenue to encourage the adoption of MRPP’s 
would be an icon or seal placed on an app’s download page 
that notified the viewer that the app was participating in the 
app store’s voluntary transparency program. Various types of 
awards could be created to show the app’s level of 
transparency or minimal data collection policy. For instance, a 
bronze award could be given to an app that has a MRPP, a 
gold award to apps whose first degree sharing partners all 
have MRPP’s, and a platinum award for apps whose entire 
data sharing web consists only of members with a MRPP. This 
would provide an incentive for app developers to work with 
companies that employ MRPP’s, even firms that don’t 
produce apps. Data aggregators have emerged in recent years 
as a highly opaque group of firms that buy and sell personal 
and non-personal data via large electronic exchanges. These 
operators are far from view and face very few accountability 
constraints. By rewarding app developers for only sharing data 
with firms that publish a MRPP, a strong incentive would 
emerge for these aggregators to become transparent, or risk 
losing business to another aggregator that does. 
An app store wishing to promote MRPP’s must select a 
simple set of semantics and provide a set of tools that makes 
creating the policy simple. Ideally, this would start by 
analyzing an app’s existing set of permissions and creating a 
framework on which the additional information could be 
added easily. Additional tools could analyze a developer’s 
draft MRPP and highlight what is needed to get the various 
icons promoted by the app store. 
With a foundation of MRPP’s, an app store could even go 
one step further by tailoring their customers’ search results to 
conform to their customers’ stated privacy preferences. 
Individual apps could be given a personalized star rating that 
would be unique to each customer. This concept overlaps with 
the notion of privacy user agents, the subject of the next 
section. 
IV. PRIVACY USER AGENTS 
In a world of MRPP enabled apps, imagine if an unknown, 
behind the scenes data aggregator had a data breach. 
Individuals are signed up for one of many services that 
monitors such things. These middle agents then update all 
their users’ policies to reflect that this particular actor is black-
listed. Now anytime those users visit a website or use a mobile 
app that has a connection with that data provider (regardless of 
how far away that connection is) they will receive a notice 
informing them of the new threat to their privacy. They can 
choose to ignore it, but some users will see this and choose to 
visit a different website or use a different app. The resulting 
drop in membership will cause some of those websites and 
apps to sever their relationships with that particular data 
aggregator, and this will lead to real economic losses to the 
aggregator that didn’t make security a priority. What was 
before an opaque relationship with accountability far removed 
from actions suddenly becomes a transparent relationship with 
immediate consequences. No government regulations were 
needed for this to occur, just well positioned actors operating 
(and potentially profiting) in the new privacy space.  
With MRPP’s in common use, a host of new tools and 
services would evolve to take advantage of the information. 
User agent apps would solicit the privacy preferences of their 
owner and use those to monitor the privacy policies of the 
other apps installed on the system. If an app’s MRPP is 
updated in a way that conflicts with the user’s privacy settings 
an alert is shown. It could even recommend other replacement 
apps and generate revenue in this way. Such apps could even 
be included with the OS by default, a sort of ‘stock’ privacy 
watchdog that can be replaced with a more feature rich one by 
a user at their discretion. These watchdog apps could 
communicate with one or more app stores to provide the sort 
of personalized recommendations described in the prior 
section. A privacy ecosystem could evolve to complement the 
data ecosystem and provide users with the tools they need to 
navigate this new, complex space. 
Another aspect of having MRPP’s that may be somewhat 
controversial is their use in law enforcement. As more 
communication moves into the digital world, traditional 
methods of gathering evidence for investigations become less 
useful. Law enforcement has a legitimate need to investigate 
crimes, and this means accessing personal information given 
appropriate legal oversight. A largely ignored overlap between 
law enforcement and privacy advocates concerns data 
transparency: both groups want to know who has what 
information, how long they keep it and who they share it with. 
It is hard to argue this information should be made available to 
the public but somehow kept from law enforcement. A system 
of MRPP’s would help police investigators know where data 
may reside and if resources should be spent requesting it 
through existing legal channels. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Machine readable privacy policies could provide the 
transparency that privacy conscious users need in order to 
make informed decisions. They could provide economic 
benefits for those app developers willing to cater to this 
market, and app stores are in a unique position to provide the 
incentives necessary to promote adoption. The resulting web 
of linked MRPP’s would provide a sorely needed 
accountability mechanism that is needed to protect individual 
privacy and fully exploit the potential gains from users sharing 
their personal information with mobile applications and other 
3rd parties. 
The first major app store to sufficiently encourage this type 
of transparency could receive an image as the app store that 
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truly values its customers’ privacy. Less popular mobile 
operating systems and their accompanying app store could 
differentiate themselves from their more successful 
competitors along a customer preference dimension that has 
yet to be catered to. It could provide the data for researchers to 
show the extent of the mobile data economy and ways it can 
be made more secure while simultaneously providing more 
benefits for consumers. This could lead other app stores to 
implement similar policies in order to remain competitive. 
This is not the be all and end all of solutions, but a workable 
first step that could foster the creation of more services geared 
towards privacy conscious users. Just as creating the app 
distribution framework led to an explosion of apps with 
features never predicted, providing a framework for privacy 
analysis could lead to privacy enhancements we can’t predict. 
However, these won’t emerge unless the underlying resources 
are available. 
The mobile app ecosystem is a highly competitive, dynamic 
market place. It’s time that privacy and transparency became 
central actors in this sphere, with influence, incentives and 
accountability mechanisms that operate at times against, at 
times with, the current set of interests. 
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